# Securing Healthcare in Australia

Essential Cybersecurity Controls for Safeguarding Patient Information

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## Context

The healthcare sector, including National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) providers, faces significant cybersecurity risks that make it one of the most targeted industries for cyberattacks. The value of sensitive patient data—such as personal identification, health records, and financial information—renders healthcare organizations appealing targets for cybercriminals. High-profile breaches have illustrated that these organizations are often ill-prepared to manage sophisticated cyber threats. This vulnerability arises from various factors, including the complexity of healthcare IT systems, the sensitivity of the data handled, and the increasing sophistication of cybercriminal tactics.

In response to these challenges, a comprehensive set of security controls has been carefully chosen for healthcare and NDIS providers. These controls focus on mitigating risks specific to the sector, addressing both the inherent vulnerabilities in healthcare IT environments and the regulatory requirements governing patient data protection.

## **Executive Summary**

The healthcare and NDIS sectors face significant cyber risk challenges due to their management of sensitive data, regulatory pressures, and the complexity of their IT systems. Cybercriminals are increasingly targeting these organizations because they hold valuable personal health records and demographic information, which can fetch high prices on the black market. The potential for financial gain through identity theft, insurance fraud, and ransomware schemes further incentivizes attacks.

A variety of vulnerabilities compound these risks, including weak password management, inadequate authentication measures, and reliance on outdated technology. Many organizations also struggle with low cybersecurity maturity, often due to limited resources, leading to an increased likelihood of successful breaches. The shift to remote work and the growing use of digital health solutions have expanded the attack surface, making healthcare providers more susceptible to cyber threats.

To address these challenges, healthcare organizations must adopt comprehensive cybersecurity measures. This includes implementing robust access controls, enhancing data encryption, and ensuring multi-factor authentication across all systems. Regular security awareness training for staff is essential to reduce the risk of human error, while continuous monitoring and proactive patch management can help mitigate vulnerabilities.

This paper assists healthcare and NDIS providers in prioritizing their cybersecurity efforts and measuring their progress towards implementing proven controls. A maturity model presented in this paper provides a framework for evaluating their current security posture and guiding improvements. By investing in a strategic approach to cybersecurity, these organizations can better protect sensitive patient information, comply with regulatory standards, and maintain trust in their services amidst a rapidly evolving threat landscape.

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## Reasons for Targeting Healthcare and NDIS Providers

Healthcare and National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) providers are increasingly becoming prime targets for cybercriminals, driven by the valuable and sensitive nature of the data they handle. Cybercriminals exploit the vulnerabilities in healthcare and NDIS systems, knowing that disruptions to these services can cause widespread impact, both financially and socially. This section explores the key reasons why healthcare and NDIS providers are attractive targets for cyberattacks.

#### 1. Sensitive Data

Healthcare and NDIS providers manage a vast amount of sensitive information, including personal health records, demographic information, and payment details. This data is highly valuable on the black market, making these organizations attractive targets for cybercriminals.

#### 2. Regulatory Pressure

Compliance requirements in Australia, such as the NDIS Code of Conduct and the Privacy Act, mandate stringent data protection measures. Non-compliance can result in significant penalties and reputational damage, creating incentives for adversaries to exploit any vulnerabilities within these organizations.

#### 3. Legacy Systems

Many healthcare organizations still rely on outdated technology and systems that lack modern security features. These legacy systems are often easier to breach due to their vulnerabilities, making them prime targets for cyberattacks.

#### 4. Ransomware Threats

The healthcare sector is particularly vulnerable to ransomware attacks. Cybercriminals are aware that disrupting healthcare operations can create urgency and pressure on organizations to respond quickly, increasing the likelihood of ransom payment to restore access to critical systems and data.

#### 5. Operational Impact

Cyberattacks on healthcare and NDIS providers can lead to severe disruptions in service delivery, affecting patient care and safety. This critical nature of their operations can make organizations more willing to negotiate with attackers.

#### 6. Low Cybersecurity Maturity

Many healthcare providers may have limited resources dedicated to cybersecurity, leading to lower maturity levels in their security posture. This lack of investment in robust cybersecurity measures makes them more susceptible to attacks.

#### 7. Increased Remote Work

The shift to remote work and telehealth services has expanded the attack surface, creating new vulnerabilities. With more endpoints and potential entry points, cybercriminals find additional opportunities to exploit weaknesses in security protocols.



## The Cyber Risk Challenges Faced by Healthcare and NDIS Providers

## **Common Vulnerabilities**

**Common Vulnerabilities** refer to weaknesses in a system or network that can be exploited by cybercriminals to gain unauthorised access, steal data, or disrupt operations. In healthcare, these vulnerabilities often include outdated software, poor access controls, unpatched systems, misconfigured security settings, and weak passwords. Addressing these vulnerabilities is crucial to protecting sensitive patient data, maintaining compliance with privacy regulations, and preventing cyberattacks such as ransomware and data breaches. Regular security assessments and updates are essential for identifying and mitigating these risks.

- 1. Weak Password Management: Many healthcare organizations struggle with weak password management across both internal and external systems, leaving them vulnerable to brute-force and password-spraying attacks. Inadequate password policies often allow users to set weak or easily guessable passwords, such as "Password123," and fail to enforce complexity requirements like minimum length or the use of special characters. The lack of account lockout mechanisms permits attackers to repeatedly attempt logins without restriction, particularly in external applications like patient portals and internal systems, increasing the risk of unauthorized access to sensitive resources. Additionally, the common practice of password reuse across multiple platforms heightens the risk of credential-based attacks, as compromised passwords can be exploited across different systems. Inconsistent enforcement of password policies, especially in multi-cloud environments, further weakens the overall security posture, making these systems easy targets for attackers looking to exploit weak credentials.
- 2. **Missing Strong Authentication:** Many healthcare organizations fail to configure Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for both privileged and regular user accounts in their cloud environments, leaving these accounts vulnerable to phishing, credential-stuffing, and other password-based attacks. The absence of MFA for privileged accounts, which typically have broad access to sensitive data and cloud infrastructure, creates a significant security gap. Additionally, the lack of MFA for standard user accounts further increases the risk of unauthorized access, particularly during credential-stuffing or phishing attempts. Attackers can leverage leaked or harvested credentials to log into Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) and remote access systems without triggering alerts, as these logins appear legitimate. Without this essential security layer, organizations face a heightened risk of data breaches, as attackers who successfully compromise a password can gain full access to critical cloud resources, undermining the overall security posture of the organization.
- 3. Use of Insecure Protocols: Many healthcare organizations still rely on insecure versions of protocols such as SMB, SSL/TLS, RDP, and SSH, which can be exploited due to missing signing and other vulnerabilities. These insecure protocols facilitate lateral movement within networks, allowing attackers to map shared resources, enumerate services, and steal credentials, ultimately enabling them to escalate access and reach critical systems and sensitive patient records. The lack of proper security measures, such as enforced encryption and robust authentication,



further exacerbates these risks, making it easier for attackers to infiltrate healthcare environments. As a result, outdated or poorly configured protocols become significant weak points, leaving sensitive data vulnerable to unauthorized access and exploitation.

- 4. End-of-Life Operating Systems: Many healthcare organizations are still using unsupported or end-of-life (EOL) operating systems, such as Windows Server 2008R2 and Windows Server 2012, which no longer receive critical security updates, leaving them vulnerable to well-known exploits. These outdated systems attract attackers due to their documented vulnerabilities, making it easy for them to compromise networks, escalate privileges, and execute malicious activities. The risk of lateral movement within a network increases significantly when an outdated system is breached, as attackers can easily exploit other connected systems. Additionally, running unsupported operating systems can lead to compliance issues and potential penalties, particularly in healthcare, where sensitive patient data is handled. Moreover, these outdated systems can create operational inefficiencies, causing compatibility issues and increased maintenance costs when interacting with modern applications.
- 5. LDAP Signing Not Enforced: Many healthcare organizations have not enforced LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol) signing, a critical security feature that protects the integrity and confidentiality of communications between directory clients and servers. Without LDAP signing, these communications are vulnerable to man-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks, allowing attackers to intercept, manipulate, and inject malicious traffic into directory queries and responses, exposing sensitive user data and directory information to unauthorized access. The lack of signing means that LDAP traffic often travels in plaintext, making it easier for attackers to retrieve sensitive information like user credentials and group memberships. Security assessments have revealed that unprotected LDAP communications can lead to LDAP relay attacks, where attackers gain unauthorized access by forwarding intercepted traffic as a trusted entity. Additionally, the inconsistent adoption of LDAP signing across systems and applications further weakens security, especially as legacy systems may still rely on unprotected communications, increasing overall vulnerability in the healthcare environment.
- 6. Vulnerable Web Component: Many healthcare organizations continue to rely on outdated or unsupported web components, such as old JavaScript libraries and client-side frameworks, in their external-facing applications. These components often contain known vulnerabilities actively targeted by attackers, increasing the risk of client-side attacks like Cross-Site Scripting (XSS), Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF), and code injection. Outdated libraries, such as unmaintained versions of jQuery or AngularJS, can be easily exploited using automated tools, allowing attackers to inject malicious code, steal credentials, or compromise user sessions. Additionally, poor dependency management often leads to vulnerable components being deployed without adequate security reviews or routine updates, further exposing institutions to risks. The lack of regular security audits makes it difficult to identify and remediate these vulnerabilities, leaving critical systems and sensitive patient data at risk of exploitation.

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## **Expanding Attack Surface**

The attack surface refers to the total number of entry points or vulnerabilities in a system, network, or application that a cybercriminal can exploit to gain unauthorised access or cause harm. Expanding the attack surface means increasing the potential points of vulnerability, which often occurs when new systems, devices, or users are added to an organisation's network, or when security protocols are not updated or properly managed.

In the healthcare sector, the attack surface has expanded significantly in recent years due to several factors, including the rise in connected medical devices (Internet of Medical Things, or IoMT), remote work, cloud adoption, and the increasing complexity of healthcare IT systems. Each of these factors introduces new potential entry points for cyberattacks:

- 1. **Increased Digitalisation**: The shift to electronic health records (EHR) and telehealth services has significantly broadened the points of potential entry for attackers. As healthcare providers increasingly rely on digital systems for patient management, the volume of sensitive data stored online rises, creating more opportunities for unauthorised access and data breaches.
- 2. Internet of Things (IoT): The adoption of IoT devices in healthcare—such as connected medical equipment, wearables, and smart home health devices—adds layers of complexity and vulnerability. These devices often lack robust security measures, making them attractive targets for attackers who can exploit them to gain access to larger networks and sensitive patient data.
- 3. **Remote Access Solutions**: The growing use of remote access technologies, especially post-pandemic, allows healthcare professionals to connect to systems from anywhere, increasing the risk of unauthorised access. If remote access solutions lack adequate security controls, such as strong authentication and encryption, they can become easy entry points for attackers.
- 4. Artificial Intelligence (AI): The integration of AI in health-tech applications offers significant benefits but also presents new security challenges. AI systems can process vast amounts of data and operate with limited oversight, potentially leading to vulnerabilities if they are not properly secured. Attackers might exploit weaknesses in AI algorithms or data integrity, manipulating outcomes or gaining unauthorised access to data.
- 5. **Health-Tech Expansion**: The rapid growth of health-tech applications, including mobile health apps and online patient portals, also contributes to the expanding attack surface. These platforms often handle sensitive health information and personal data, yet they may not be built with sufficient security measures. As more patients engage with these technologies, the risk of exploitation increases.
- 6. **Dependence on SaaS Applications**: The increasing reliance on Software-as-a-Service (SaaS) applications for various healthcare functions from patient management to billing—also heightens security risks. While these applications can enhance operational efficiency, they often store sensitive patient data in the cloud, exposing organisations to potential data breaches. If security measures, such as Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) or proper access controls, are not implemented, attackers can exploit these platforms to gain unauthorised access to critical information.



## Value of Patient Records

Patient records are among the most valuable data types for cybercriminals, often fetching high prices on the dark web—sometimes as much as \$250 to \$1,000 per record, depending on the information contained. This significant monetary value stems from the potential uses of stolen data, including identity theft, insurance fraud, and unauthorised access to medical benefits, which can lead to substantial financial gain for attackers.

Additionally, the rise of "big game hunting" has emerged as a troubling trend, where attackers specifically target high-profile individuals—celebrities, politicians, and executives—whose medical records can be ransomed to prevent the public disclosure of sensitive health information. These high-stakes breaches not only yield financial rewards but also allow attackers to leverage the threat of public exposure to extract larger ransoms, capitalising on the potential reputational damage and personal distress that could follow a data leak.

Moreover, the sensitive nature of healthcare data means that breaches can have dire consequences, not only financially but also in terms of patient safety and trust. Cybercriminals can also leverage ransomware to hold patient care hostage, demanding hefty ransoms to restore access to critical systems and data. This tactic increases the stakes for attackers and places immense pressure on healthcare organisations, which must navigate the ethical and operational challenges of paying ransoms while ensuring patient care continuity. As a result, the healthcare sector faces a dual threat: the high resale value of patient records on the dark web, the potential for devastating operational disruptions due to ransomware attacks, and the targeting of high-profile patients to maximise the impact of their malicious activities. Robust cybersecurity measures are thus essential to mitigate these risks and protect sensitive patient information.

Healthcare data is valuable and vulnerable to misuse in Australia. Stolen data is used for:

- Fraud and Identity Theft (e.g., fake identities, insurance fraud)
- Pharmaceutical Marketing (targeted ads, predictive analytics)
- Prescription Drug Fraud (fake prescriptions)
- Phishing and Social Engineering (scams using personal health info)
- Blackmail and Extortion (threatening exposure of sensitive health info)
- Rising Healthcare Costs (fraudulent claims, higher premiums)

Further details on these points can be found in Annex 3, including the ethical and legal concerns surrounding the use and sale of healthcare data.



## Complexity of IT Systems

Healthcare IT environments are complex and often fragmented. Organisations may operate multiple systems—ranging from legacy applications to modern cloud solutions—that can complicate data protection efforts. This complexity can result in:

#### 1. Inconsistent Security Policies

The diverse range of systems often leads to inconsistent security policies across the organisation. Different applications may have varying levels of security measures in place—some may utilise robust encryption and access controls, while others may lack basic protections. This disparity creates vulnerabilities that can be easily exploited by attackers, as they can identify and target the weakest links in the security chain.

#### 2. Poor Visibility

With multiple systems in play, IT teams may struggle to maintain a comprehensive view of all assets within the organisation. This lack of visibility makes it difficult to identify vulnerabilities, track data flows, and monitor access controls effectively. If IT teams cannot see all endpoints and systems in their environment, they may miss critical security updates or fail to detect anomalies that could indicate a breach. This gap in visibility can lead to delayed responses to security incidents and an inability to effectively manage risks.

#### 3. Integration Challenges

The integration of disparate systems can introduce additional complexity. When merging data from legacy systems with modern applications, organisations may inadvertently expose themselves to security risks if proper safeguards are not in place. Poorly integrated systems can lead to data silos, where sensitive information is isolated and difficult to secure.

#### 4. Fragmented User Identities

The complexity of healthcare IT systems is further compounded by the need for a single identity source for user authentication and access management. Many organisations struggle with fragmented user identities, where individuals may have multiple accounts across various systems, leading to inconsistent access controls and increased risk of unauthorised access. Implementing a unified identity management system enables centralised access control, simplifying user provisioning and deprovisioning, which enhances security by ensuring that former employees no longer retain access to sensitive data. This approach also improves compliance with regulatory requirements, such as HIPAA, by facilitating better tracking of user activity and easier auditing of access controls. Additionally, a single identity source allows for advanced security features like Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) and Single Sign-On (SSO), enhancing security while streamlining the user experience. However, implementing such a system can be complex, as organisations must address integration challenges with legacy systems and ensure staff training for effective adoption. Overall, adopting a single identity source is essential for improving data protection in healthcare IT environments while navigating the intricacies of their systems.



## Role of AI and Increasing Sophistication of Attacks

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is a double-edged sword in the cybersecurity landscape. While AI can enhance security measures, it is also employed by cybercriminals to increase the effectiveness of phishing attacks. AI can:

#### **Craft More Convincing Phishing Messages**

By analysing communication patterns, AI can generate messages that mimic legitimate communications, making them harder to detect. AI can significantly enhance the effectiveness of phishing attacks by analysing communication patterns within organisations. By studying the language, tone, and structure of legitimate emails, AI systems can generate messages that closely resemble authentic communications. This includes not only mimicking the writing style of specific individuals but also incorporating contextually relevant details that make the messages appear genuine. For example, AI can pull information from social media or company websites to personalise messages, referencing recent projects or internal events that may resonate with the recipient. This level of sophistication makes it increasingly difficult for individuals to recognise phishing attempts, as these AI-crafted messages may bypass traditional spam filters and detection mechanisms. The result is a higher likelihood of unsuspecting users clicking on malicious links or providing sensitive information, which can lead to significant data breaches and financial loss.

#### **Automate Attack Techniques**

Al can be used to automate the identification of vulnerabilities and execute attacks at scale. Al empowers cybercriminals to automate various attack techniques, transforming the landscape of cyber threats. By utilising machine learning algorithms, attackers can swiftly identify vulnerabilities in systems and applications without the need for manual intervention. For instance, Al can analyse software configurations, system logs, and historical attack data to pinpoint weaknesses that could be exploited. This automation enables attackers to execute scans across multiple targets simultaneously, significantly increasing the speed and scale of their operations.



## Limitations of Existing Security Controls

Despite the implementation of various security controls, many healthcare organisations face limitations that hinder their effectiveness:

#### 1. Reactive Measures

Many healthcare organisations often rely on security measures that are predominantly reactive, meaning they focus on responding to threats after they have manifested rather than preventing them from occurring in the first place. This approach can create a significant vulnerability within the organisation, as it allows attackers to exploit weaknesses before defences can be effectively mobilised. For instance, incident response plans may only be activated once a breach is detected, resulting in delayed reactions and increased potential damage. Additionally, organisations might invest in technologies like firewalls and antivirus software but neglect to implement proactive strategies such as threat hunting, vulnerability assessments, and penetration testing that could identify and mitigate risks before they lead to breaches. This reliance on reactive measures can perpetuate a cycle of damage and recovery, ultimately compromising patient safety and trust in the healthcare system.

#### 2. Lack of Continuous Monitoring

Insufficient real-time monitoring is another critical limitation faced by healthcare organisations, allowing threats to persist undetected until they cause significant damage. Many traditional security solutions operate on scheduled scans or periodic assessments, which can miss ongoing or emerging threats. For instance, malware or unauthorised access might go unnoticed for days, weeks, or even months, providing attackers with ample time to infiltrate systems and exfiltrate sensitive data. Continuous monitoring solutions, such as Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) systems, are essential for detecting anomalies and suspicious activity in real time. However, many organisations lack the resources, expertise, or technology to implement and maintain such systems effectively. This gap not only increases the risk of data breaches but also hampers the organisation's ability to comply with regulatory requirements, potentially resulting in hefty fines and reputational damage.

#### 3. Inadequate Training

Inadequate training for staff on cybersecurity best practices significantly contributes to the vulnerabilities within healthcare organisations. Many employees, including those who handle sensitive patient information, may not receive regular or comprehensive training on recognising phishing attempts, secure password management, or safe internet practices. This lack of awareness can lead to human errors, such as falling victim to social engineering attacks or mishandling sensitive data, which are often the primary entry points for cybercriminals. Furthermore, as cybersecurity threats evolve, continuous education becomes vital to ensure that staff are equipped to recognise new tactics employed by attackers. Without a robust training program, organisations leave themselves exposed to preventable risks, emphasising the necessity of fostering a culture of cybersecurity awareness and responsibility among all employees. By prioritising training and education, healthcare organisations can significantly reduce their susceptibility to human error and enhance their overall security posture.

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## Additional Factors Contributing to Vulnerability

In today's digital healthcare landscape, organisations face an increasing array of cybersecurity risks. As healthcare providers continue to adopt new technologies, third-party partnerships, and interconnected systems, their vulnerability to cyberattacks grows. Despite implementing various security measures, many healthcare organisations still encounter significant challenges in managing these risks. These challenges can compromise patient data, disrupt operations, and jeopardise trust in the healthcare system. The following sections highlight key vulnerabilities in the healthcare sector, including third-party risks, inadequate incident response plans, and cultural challenges, while offering insights into how organisations can strengthen their cybersecurity posture.

#### 1. Third-Party Risks

Many healthcare organisations increasingly rely on third-party vendors for various services, including cloud storage, software applications, and medical devices, which significantly heightens the risk of supply chain attacks. These vendors may have access to sensitive patient data or critical infrastructure, making them attractive targets for cybercriminals. If a vendor's systems are compromised, attackers can gain indirect access to the healthcare organisation's networks, potentially resulting in data breaches or operational disruptions. Additionally, healthcare organisations often have limited visibility into the security practices of their third-party vendors, which can lead to assumptions of safety that may not hold true. Insufficient vetting and ongoing monitoring of vendor security practices can leave organisations vulnerable to exploits that take advantage of weak links in the supply chain. As the interconnectedness of healthcare systems grows, addressing third-party risks becomes essential for safeguarding patient data and maintaining trust.

#### 2. Inadequate Incident Response Plans

The absence of robust incident response plans can significantly exacerbate the impact of a breach within healthcare organisations. When an attack occurs, the lack of predefined roles, responsibilities, and procedures can lead to confusion and delays in response efforts. This unpreparedness can result in prolonged downtime, increased recovery costs, and even greater data loss. A well-structured incident response plan outlines clear steps for identifying, containing, eradicating, and recovering from incidents, enabling organisations to act swiftly and efficiently. Additionally, regular testing and updating of these plans are crucial to ensure that they remain relevant amid evolving threats. Without a comprehensive strategy, organisations may struggle to manage incidents effectively, leading to longer recovery times and potentially jeopardising patient safety and care continuity.



#### 3. Cultural Challenges

Cultural challenges within many healthcare organisations can further contribute to vulnerabilities in cybersecurity. Often, the focus on patient care takes precedence over security considerations, leading to underinvestment in necessary cybersecurity measures. This mindset may result in insufficient resources allocated to security technologies, personnel training, and ongoing risk assessments. Moreover, if cybersecurity is not seen as a priority at the organisational level, staff may not perceive their role in protecting sensitive data as important, increasing the likelihood of human error. Changing this culture requires leadership to actively promote cybersecurity awareness and integrate it into the organisation's mission. By fostering a culture that values both patient care and cybersecurity, healthcare organisations can enhance their resilience against cyber threats and create a more secure environment for both patients and providers.

#### 4. Diverse Workforce and Varied Skillsets

Healthcare organisations typically employ a broad range of personnel with varied skillsets, including doctors, nurses, administrative staff, cleaners, data entry operators, and IT specialists. This diverse workforce presents a unique challenge for cybersecurity, as employees' awareness of security risks and their ability to implement best practices can vary widely. Healthcare staff may have different levels of technical expertise, with some lacking awareness of basic security hygiene or the latest phishing tactics. This discrepancy in skills and knowledge increases the risk of human error, which is often a key entry point for cybercriminals. Furthermore, high turnover and temporary staffing can exacerbate these challenges, as new or transient employees may not be sufficiently trained in security protocols. Addressing this challenge requires a comprehensive cybersecurity training program tailored to various job roles, ensuring that all employees, regardless of their role or expertise, understand the importance of data protection and their responsibility in maintaining a secure environment.



## **Control Maturity Level**

In this section, we introduce a framework comprising ten key cybersecurity controls and two maturity levels, structured around the core cybersecurity paradigms of Prevention, Detection, and Incident Response. These controls are designed to help healthcare and NDIS providers strengthen their security posture in a systematic and effective manner. Organisations are encouraged to assess these controls in the context of the specific sensitivity of the data they manage, their existing security measures, and their current maturity levels. A thorough evaluation will ensure that the chosen controls align with the unique risks and compliance requirements inherent in their operations.

It is crucial to understand that achieving a foundational maturity level across all ten controls is far more beneficial than focusing solely on elevating select controls to a higher maturity level. Striving for maturity level 1 across all ten controls provides a solid baseline of security that ensures a comprehensive defence against potential threats. In contrast, achieving maturity level 2 on only a few controls, while neglecting to reach maturity level 1 on others, creates significant gaps in the overall security framework. Such inconsistencies can leave organisations vulnerable, undermining the effectiveness of their cybersecurity efforts.

By prioritising a balanced approach to maturity across all controls, healthcare and NDIS providers can establish a more resilient cybersecurity posture, ensuring they are better equipped to prevent incidents, detect threats, and respond effectively when breaches occur. This holistic strategy not only enhances protection for sensitive patient information but also fosters greater compliance with regulatory standards and instils confidence among stakeholders.

| No. | Control           | Description                                     | Maturity Level 1  | Maturity Level 2   | Justification/Rationale   |
|-----|-------------------|---|---|--|---|
| 1   | Access<br>Control | Restrict access<br>to sensitive<br>information. | <ol> <li>Assign users to roles that<br/>dictate access to data and<br/>systems.</li> <li>Limit access based on<br/>the user's identity.</li> <li>Restrict access<br/>according to the assigned<br/>role.</li> </ol> | <ul> <li>5. Identify users based on multifactor authentication (MFA).</li> <li>6. Utilise role-based access control (RBAC) to define user access levels.</li> <li>7. Require user device authentication to verify trusted devices.</li> <li>8. Enforce least privilege access</li> </ul> | Implementing access control in the<br>healthcare industry for patient data is<br>crucial for ensuring patient privacy,<br>confidentiality, safety, regulatory<br>compliance, and data loss due to<br>cyber-attacks. |



|   |   |   | 4. Implement IP address filtering to control access.   | to limit data access to only what is necessary for each user.  |  |
|---|---|---|--|--|--|
| 2 | Data<br>Encryption                      |   | <ol> <li>All communications in<br/>transit must be encrypted<br/>using TLS version 1.2 or<br/>higher.</li> <li>Users' local hard disks<br/>must be encrypted.</li> <li>All removable media<br/>containing sensitive data<br/>must be encrypted.</li> </ol>   | <ul> <li>4. All data at rest must be<br/>securely encrypted, including:</li> <li>Database files.</li> <li>Full disk content.</li> <li>Sensitive documents on local<br/>drives.</li> <li>Files in cloud storage.</li> <li>Archived data.</li> <li>Backups.</li> <li>Virtual machine snapshots.</li> <li>Data on removable storage.</li> </ul>                     | Safeguarding confidential patient<br>data against unauthorised access<br>during transmission, storage, and<br>movement is essential to ensure<br>compliance with regulations, protect<br>patient privacy, maintain data<br>integrity, and mitigate risks<br>associated with data breaches.   |
| 3 | Multi-Factor<br>Authentication<br>(MFA) | Use multiple<br>forms of<br>verification for<br>accessing<br>systems. | <ol> <li>Apply multi-factor         <ul> <li>authentication to privileged</li> <li>accounts of all SaaS and</li> <li>remote access</li> <li>applications.</li> </ul> </li> <li>Apply multi-factor         <ul> <li>authentication to all SaaS</li> <li>and remote access</li> <li>applications and systems.</li> </ul> </li> <li>Apply multi-factor         <ul> <li>authentication to systems.</li> </ul> </li> <li>Apply multi-factor         <ul> <li>authentication to systems.</li> </ul> </li> </ol> | <ul> <li>4. Apply multi-factor<br/>authentication to applications<br/>and systems used to manage IT<br/>infrastructure.</li> <li>5. Apply multi-factor<br/>authentication to systems and<br/>applications that store PII<br/>records.</li> <li>6. Apply multi-factor<br/>authentication to all non-<br/>privileged accounts of SaaS<br/>applications.</li> </ul> | Implementing multi-factor<br>authentication (MFA) is essential for<br>enhancing security by providing an<br>additional layer of verification that<br>significantly reduces the risk of<br>unauthorised access, while allowing<br>users to maintain strong, unique<br>passwords without frequent<br>changes, thus mitigating password<br>fatigue, brute force attacks, and<br>credential theft, and effectively<br>identifying users. |



| 4 | Data Backup<br>and Recovery | Regular backups<br>of critical data<br>and tested<br>recovery<br>procedures.                             | <ol> <li>Ensure that backups of<br/>critical systems and data<br/>are performed daily.</li> <li>Test backups annually to<br/>verify their integrity and<br/>ensure successful data<br/>restoration.</li> <li>Store backups offsite to<br/>protect against local<br/>disasters.</li> <li>Encrypt all backups to<br/>safeguard sensitive data<br/>from unauthorised access.</li> <li>Review backups monthly<br/>to ensure they are<br/>functioning correctly.</li> </ol> | <ul> <li>6. Control access to the backup<br/>application using multi-factor<br/>authentication (MFA).</li> <li>7. Require MFA for any<br/>modifications or deletions of<br/>backup jobs to prevent<br/>unauthorised changes.</li> <li>8. Trigger alerts and conduct<br/>reviews when changes to<br/>backups are made or when<br/>administrative access to the<br/>backup system occurs,<br/>ensuring oversight and<br/>accountability.</li> </ul> | Implementing regular backups is<br>crucial for protecting against<br>ransomware attacks, accidental data<br>loss, theft, and deletion, ensuring<br>that critical systems and data can be<br>quickly restored to minimise<br>downtime and maintain business<br>continuity.  |
|---|-----------------------------|--|--|---|--|
| 5 | Network<br>Security         | Implement<br>firewalls,<br>intrusion<br>detection<br>systems, and<br>threat<br>intelligence<br>blocking. | <ol> <li>Segment user traffic<br/>from systems storing or<br/>processing sensitive data<br/>using firewalls.</li> <li>Segment systems with<br/>services that are publicly<br/>exposed using firewalls.</li> <li>Segment user traffic<br/>from systems storing or</li> </ol>  | <ul> <li>5. Implement a firewall with<br/>Intrusion Prevention System<br/>(IPS) to protect exposed<br/>services.</li> <li>6. The firewall must be<br/>configured to perform SSL<br/>inspection of all inbound traffic<br/>destined to exposed services.</li> <li>7. Incorporate Threat<br/>Intelligence Blocking to restrict</li> </ul>   | Implement network segmentation to<br>isolate sensitive data and critical<br>systems, reducing the attack surface<br>and limiting the potential impact of a<br>breach. Block access to high-risk<br>infrastructure and deploy an<br>Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) to<br>proactively detect and mitigate<br>potential threats. These strategies<br>enhance network security by<br>preventing lateral movement within<br>the network and stopping malicious |

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|   |  |  | <ul><li>processing sensitive data using firewalls.</li><li>4. Segment systems with services that are publicly exposed using firewalls.</li></ul>  | <ul> <li>inbound and outbound access</li> <li>correlating with:</li> <li>Malicious IP Addresses</li> <li>Malicious Domains</li> <li>High-risk countries</li> <li>High-risk Top-Level<br/>Domains (TLDs)</li> <li>High-risk Autonomous<br/>System Numbers (ASNs)</li> </ul>  | actors before they can exploit<br>vulnerabilities.   |
|---|--|--|---|---|--|
| 6 | Extended<br>Detection and<br>Response<br>(XDR) | Continuously<br>monitor, hunt<br>and incident<br>respond to<br>breaches. | <ol> <li>Utilise Extended         Detection and Response         (XDR) to identify breaches         through daily forensic         assessments, along with         dark web monitoring and         credential theft detection.         </li> <li>Respond to all critical</li>         alerts within 15 minutes.         Conduct dark web         credential theft monitoring.         Respond to breached         credentials by notifying the         impacted user and         changing the password         within 4 hours of the         notification.</ol> | <ul> <li>5. Implement Extended</li> <li>Detection and Response (XDR)</li> <li>to conduct daily forensic</li> <li>assessments of workstations</li> <li>and servers, validating all</li> <li>suspicious post-breach</li> <li>artifacts. Additionally, use XDR</li> <li>to identify and detect any</li> <li>unusual user identity-related</li> <li>activities.</li> <li>6. Perform Extended Detection</li> <li>and Response (XDR) to validate</li> <li>all suspicious memory artefacts</li> <li>on workstations and servers</li> <li>using daily forensic</li> <li>assessments.</li> <li>7. Respond to all validated</li> <li>breaches within 15 minutes.</li> </ul> | Adopt an independent threat<br>detection methodology that<br>continuously monitors for and<br>actively hunts advanced malware<br>and adversaries that may have<br>bypassed existing security controls.<br>This approach enhances the<br>organisation's ability to detect and<br>respond to sophisticated threats,<br>ensuring early identification of<br>potential breaches and minimising<br>the impact of evasive attacks. |



| 7 | Application<br>Whitelisting | Allow only<br>approved<br>applications to<br>run on systems.             | <ol> <li>Enforce application<br/>controls whereby all<br/>application installations<br/>are automatically blocked<br/>unless reviewed and<br/>approved by an<br/>administrator.</li> <li>Enforce application<br/>controls whereby all<br/>executable, library, drivers,<br/>and scripts are<br/>automatically blocked<br/>unless reviewed and<br/>approved by an<br/>administrator.</li> <li>Enforce application<br/>controls whereby all<br/>access to storage devices<br/>storing patient records is<br/>automatically blocked<br/>unless reviewed and<br/>approved by an<br/>administrator.</li> </ol> | <ul> <li>4. Implement controls to<br/>prevent unauthorised files from<br/>executing on systems, thereby<br/>reducing the risk of malware<br/>infections that could target<br/>sensitive data.</li> <li>5. Enforce strict access controls<br/>to ensure that only authorised<br/>personnel can access patient<br/>records, safeguarding<br/>confidentiality and minimising<br/>the risk of data breaches.</li> </ul> | Implement controls to prevent<br>unauthorised files from executing on<br>systems, thereby reducing the risk of<br>malware infections that could target<br>sensitive data. Additionally, enforce<br>strict access controls to ensure that<br>only authorised personnel can<br>access patient records, safeguarding<br>confidentiality and minimising the<br>risk of data breaches. |
|---|-----------------------------|--|---|---|---|
| 8 | Vulnerability<br>Management | Detect and<br>remediate<br>system and<br>application<br>vulnerabilities. | <ol> <li>Patch all user<br/>workstations weekly.</li> <li>Patch all servers<br/>monthly.</li> </ol>   | 6. Enforce strong, complex<br>passwords with minimum<br>length, special characters, and<br>lockout mechanisms that can<br>withstand brute-force attacks.  | Regularly identify and address known<br>security vulnerabilities to prevent<br>exploitation, with a focus on critical<br>systems handling patient data.<br>Timely patching and remediation are<br>essential to maintaining the  |



|   |   |  | <ol> <li>Patch all publicly<br/>exposed systems and<br/>applications with medium,<br/>high or critical<br/>vulnerabilities within 3<br/>days.</li> <li>Replace unsupported OS<br/>versions with supported<br/>ones to prevent<br/>exploitation of known<br/>vulnerabilities and ensure<br/>compliance.</li> <li>Update or replace<br/>outdated web components<br/>(e.g., JavaScript libraries) to<br/>mitigate client-side attacks<br/>like XSS, CSRF, and code<br/>injection.</li> </ol> | <ul> <li>7. Do not reuse passwords<br/>across platforms.</li> <li>8. Upgrade outdated protocols<br/>(e.g., SMB, SSL/TLS, RDP) and<br/>enforce encryption to prevent<br/>lateral movement and<br/>credential theft.</li> <li>9. Enforce LDAP signing to<br/>secure communications and<br/>prevent man-in-the-middle<br/>(MitM) attacks and<br/>unauthorised access to<br/>directory data.</li> <li>10. Ensure that all custom-<br/>developed applications are free<br/>from vulnerabilities before being<br/>deployed to production by<br/>incorporating security practices<br/>throughout the development<br/>lifecycle.</li> </ul> | confidentiality and integrity of patient<br>information, ensuring that potential<br>security flaws are mitigated before<br>they can be leveraged by attackers.  |
|---|---|--|---|---|---|
| 9 | Security<br>Awareness<br>and Incident<br>Response<br>Training | Regular security<br>training for all<br>staff on security<br>best practices. | <ol> <li>Provide staff monthly<br/>security awareness<br/>training.</li> <li>Perform monthly<br/>simulated phishing and<br/>measure KPIs of the<br/>program to identify high-</li> </ol>  | <ul> <li>5. Perform monthly simulated<br/>smishing, vishing, social media<br/>impersonations, USB drops,<br/>and measure KPIs of the<br/>program to identify high-risk<br/>users within the organisation.</li> <li>6. Tie employee bonuses to<br/>measurable improvements in</li> </ul>   | Ensure that all staff are trained to<br>recognise potential cybersecurity<br>threats and follow secure practices<br>in their daily operations. This helps<br>minimise human error, prevent<br>security breaches, and reduce the<br>impact of incidents by fostering a |

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|    |                        |  | risk users within the<br>organisation.<br>3. Provide high-risk users<br>additional security<br>awareness training aimed<br>at changing their high-risk<br>behaviour.<br>4. A bi-annual email from<br>the CEO emphasising the<br>importance of completing<br>cybersecurity training. | cybersecurity behaviours, such<br>as timely reporting of<br>suspicious activity, their overall<br>risk score, and participation in<br>security awareness training.<br>7. Regularly conduct simulated<br>security incident drills and<br>tabletop exercises to assess<br>and improve the organisation's<br>incident response and<br>management processes. These<br>exercises should cover a variety<br>of potential scenarios,<br>including:<br>- Data breaches<br>- Malware outbreaks<br>- Credential exposure<br>- Theft of workstations<br>- Unauthorised access to SaaS<br>accounts<br>- Ransomware attacks<br>- Unauthorised remote access<br>to exposed services or systems. | culture of vigilance and proactive<br>security awareness.  |
|----|------------------------|--|---|---|--|
| 10 | Penetration<br>Testing | Conduct regular<br>tests to identify<br>vulnerabilities in<br>systems. | <ol> <li>Implement automated<br/>testing tools to conduct<br/>daily security assessments<br/>of web applications.</li> <li>Perform monthly external<br/>penetration testing to</li> </ol>   | 3. Conduct regular Red Teaming<br>exercises to simulate realistic,<br>multi-faceted cyberattacks on<br>the organisation's<br>infrastructure.  | Regularly assess and test security<br>controls to identify weaknesses and<br>gaps in the organisation's defenses.<br>By proactively identifying<br>vulnerabilities, appropriate measures<br>can be implemented to strengthen |

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|  | simulate real-world attacks  | 4. Conduct annual internal     | security and safeguard patient data     |
|--|------------------------------|--------------------------------|---|
|  | and identify exploitable     | penetration testing only after | from potential threats and breaches.    |
|  | vulnerabilities in external- | achieving Maturity Level 2 in  | The approach to internal penetration    |
|  | facing systems.              | Vulnerability Management. The  | testing ensures that resources are      |
|  |                              | testing should focus on        | used effectively, avoiding the          |
|  |                              | identifying advanced or        | identification of low-hanging fruit and |
|  |                              | undetected threats that may    | instead targeting potential risks not   |
|  |                              | bypass previous vulnerability  | previously addressed by internal        |
|  |                              | assessments and patching.      | vulnerability management systems.       |
|  |                              |                                |   |



## Implementing Cybersecurity Controls for Healthcare and NDIS Providers

Implementing the following cybersecurity controls effectively requires a balanced approach that considers both technological solutions and business processes. By addressing gaps in their current security posture and exploring outsourcing options with MSPs, healthcare and NDIS providers can enhance their defenses against cyber threats while managing costs. A proactive, strategic investment in cybersecurity is essential for safeguarding sensitive patient information and maintaining compliance with regulatory standards.

| No. | CONTROL         | COST & DIFFICULTY IMPLICATIONS   | OUTSOURCING OPTIONS  |
|-----|-----------------|--|--|
| 1   | ACCESS CONTROL  | Cost: Medium to high cost for initial setup,<br>depending on the number of users and systems that<br>require access controls. Ongoing costs are typically<br>low, primarily related to periodic reviews and<br>updates to access rights.<br>Difficulty: Medium difficulty, as implementing role-<br>based access control (RBAC) and multi-factor<br>authentication (MFA) can be technically complex<br>and require integration with existing systems.<br>Regular access audits and enforcement of least<br>privilege principles can also be challenging to<br>manage at scale. | <b>Outsourcing Options:</b> Outsourcing access management<br>and identity and access management (IAM) systems can be<br>considered if the organisation lacks in-house expertise or<br>resources. Providers can implement RBAC, MFA solutions,<br>and perform access reviews. However, internal teams<br>should monitor compliance, as access control is critical for<br>protecting sensitive data. For regular access audits,<br>outsourcing to a managed service provider (MSP) can help<br>offload the operational burden. |
| 2   | DATA ENCRYPTION | Cost: High upfront costs for implementing<br>encryption technologies (e.g., TLS, full-disk<br>encryption), and securing encryption keys. Ongoing<br>costs are moderate, involving key management,<br>monitoring, and the need to ensure encryption<br>compliance.<br>Difficulty: High, especially in organisations with<br>large data sets or complex data storage   | <b>Outsourcing Options:</b> Encryption key management and the implementation of encryption protocols can be outsourced to specialised vendors or cloud providers. For example, many cloud services (AWS, Azure) offer managed encryption solutions. However, the organisation should retain responsibility for compliance monitoring and recovery procedures. Regular audits for data encryption can   |

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|   |   | environments. Ensuring encryption is applied<br>consistently across all storage mediums and<br>transmission channels can be challenging. The<br>complexity increases with hybrid environments<br>(cloud/on-premises).   | be outsourced, but direct control over the encryption strategy should remain internal.  |
|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | MULTI-FACTOR<br>AUTHENTICATION<br>(MFA) | Cost: Low to medium cost for setting up MFA, with<br>expenses for MFA tools, licensing, and user training.<br>The ongoing cost is minimal, typically associated<br>with maintaining the MFA solution and providing<br>support for users.<br>Difficulty: Low to medium. MFA is relatively easy to<br>implement using cloud-based services (like Google<br>Authenticator or Microsoft Authenticator). However,<br>integration with legacy systems or on-premises<br>infrastructure can pose challenges. | <b>Outsourcing Options:</b> MFA solution implementation can be<br>outsourced to third-party providers that offer turnkey MFA<br>systems (e.g., Duo Security, Okta, RSA Security). They can<br>handle setup, integration, and maintenance. While<br>outsourced MFA solutions can manage the infrastructure,<br>internal teams should oversee user adoption and train<br>employees. Outsourcing is particularly helpful when scaling<br>MFA to a large user base quickly. |
| 4 | DATA BACKUP AND<br>RECOVERY             | <b>Cost:</b> High initial costs for implementing a comprehensive backup system (software, storage, cloud solutions). Ongoing costs involve backup storage fees, recovery drills, and management. <b>Difficulty:</b> Medium to high. Ensuring regular backups of critical systems and validating their integrity can be time-consuming. Managing disaster recovery plans and testing them regularly also requires dedicated resources.   | <b>Outsourcing Options:</b> Outsource backup storage and disaster recovery management to a managed service provider (MSP) or cloud provider (AWS, Azure, or specialised backup services like Veeam or Datto). Outsourcing backup storage can reduce operational overhead, while providers can handle offsite storage and backup testing. However, the organisation must maintain control over data classification and recovery plan testing.                            |
| 5 | NETWORK SECURITY                        | <b>Cost:</b> Medium to high cost for implementing and maintaining firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS), and intrusion prevention systems (IPS). The cost increases if advanced security features (e.g., SSL inspection, threat intelligence) are required.  | <b>Outsourcing Options:</b> Outsourcing firewall management,<br>threat intelligence feeds, and network monitoring to an<br>MSSP can help streamline network security operations.<br>MSSPs can deploy and maintain IPS and firewalls and<br>provide continuous monitoring. However, internal teams   |

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|   |  | <b>Difficulty:</b> High. Network security configurations require expertise to implement segmentation and threat intelligence effectively. Ongoing management and tuning of IPS and firewalls can be complex and resource intensive.   | should still manage incident response and ensure that<br>network segmentation aligns with organisational security<br>policies.  |
|---|--|---|---|
| 6 | EXTENDED DETECTION<br>AND RESPONSE (XDR) | Cost: High initial and ongoing costs for<br>implementing an XDR solution, as well as for hiring<br>skilled personnel to manage it. XDR requires<br>advanced tools for continuous monitoring and<br>forensics, which can be expensive.<br>Difficulty: High. Deploying and fine-tuning an XDR<br>solution can be technically demanding, requiring<br>deep integration with existing security tools and<br>processes. Constant monitoring and response to<br>alerts can strain internal resources. | <b>Outsourcing Options:</b> XDR services are often provided by<br>MSSPs or specialised vendors. Outsourcing XDR<br>management can help offload the complexity of continuous<br>monitoring and threat hunting. However, the organisation<br>should maintain internal control over critical incident<br>response processes and recovery actions.                                      |
| 7 | APPLICATION<br>WHITELISTING              | Cost: Medium cost for implementing application<br>whitelisting technologies and maintaining the<br>whitelist. Ongoing costs are typically low, except<br>when new applications or updates need to be added<br>or tested.<br>Difficulty: Medium. Application whitelisting can be<br>difficult to manage, particularly in organisations with<br>many applications or frequent software updates.<br>Managing exclusions and ensuring compatibility can<br>be challenging.                          | <b>Outsourcing Options:</b> Application whitelisting solutions<br>can be outsourced to specialised vendors or MSPs. These<br>providers can manage the whitelisting process and ensure<br>that only approved applications are allowed to run on the<br>network. However, internal teams should work with the<br>vendor to ensure the whitelist is accurate and updated<br>regularly. |
| 8 | VULNERABILITY<br>MANAGEMENT              | <b>Cost:</b> Medium cost for vulnerability scanning tools<br>and the resources required to patch and remediate<br>vulnerabilities. Patching may require downtime or<br>impact business operations.  | <b>Outsourcing Options:</b> Vulnerability scanning and remediation can be outsourced to MSSPs or specialised vendors. These providers can conduct regular vulnerability assessments, prioritise vulnerabilities, and manage   |

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|    |  | <b>Difficulty:</b> Medium. Regular vulnerability scanning, patching, and remediation can be complex, especially in large, diverse environments. Managing vulnerabilities on legacy systems or third-party applications adds to the difficulty.  | patching. However, internal teams should oversee the remediation process to ensure compliance and minimise business disruption.  |
|----|--|---|--|
| 9  | SECURITY<br>AWARENESS &<br>INCIDENT RESPONSE<br>TRAINING | Cost: Low to medium cost for developing or<br>purchasing security awareness training programs,<br>conducting simulated phishing campaigns, and<br>running incident response exercises. Ongoing costs<br>are minimal but include the time spent on regular<br>training and exercises.<br>Difficulty: Low to medium. While training programs<br>can be easily implemented, ensuring employee<br>engagement and retention of security knowledge can<br>be challenging. Running effective incident response<br>drills requires coordination and planning. | <b>Outsourcing Options:</b> Security awareness training programs, including phishing simulations, can be outsourced to specialised vendors. These vendors can provide the tools and resources for ongoing awareness training. Incident response exercises and tabletop simulations can also be outsourced to security consulting firms. However, internal teams should take the lead in customising training content and managing follow-up activities.  |
| 10 | PENETRATION<br>TESTING                                   | Cost: High cost for regular external and internal<br>penetration testing. Tests can be expensive due to<br>the need for skilled professionals and the time<br>involved in testing complex environments.<br>Difficulty: High. Penetration testing requires<br>specialised skills, especially for sophisticated<br>internal and external assessments (Red Teaming).<br>Managing internal resources for frequent testing can<br>be challenging.  | <b>Outsourcing Options:</b> Penetration testing is typically<br>outsourced to specialised security firms or consultants.<br>External testing provides an unbiased view of the<br>organisation's security posture. Red Teaming and advanced<br>testing should also be outsourced to expert firms. However,<br>internal teams should manage remediation efforts and<br>ensure that lessons learned from tests are incorporated into<br>security practices. |

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## Comprehensive Incident Response Playbook for Patient Record Data Loss and Ransomware Incidents

Healthcare providers are prime targets for cyberattacks, including ransomware and data breaches, due to the high value of patient data and the critical nature of healthcare operations. An effective response to these incidents is essential for minimising damage, maintaining patient trust, and ensuring compliance with legal and regulatory requirements. Below, you'll find a **Ransomware Incident Response Plan** and a **Data Breach Incident Response Plan** specifically tailored to the healthcare environment. These plans are based on best practices and guidelines from trusted resources such as **Cyber.gov.au** and the **Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC)**.

## Objectives

- Protect Sensitive Patient Data: Ensure patient data is safeguarded and privacy is maintained throughout an incident.
- Maintain Trust: Act swiftly and transparently to uphold patient and stakeholder confidence.
- Ensure Compliance: Adhere to healthcare regulations and Australian privacy laws, including the Privacy Act 1988 and the Notifiable Data Breaches (NDB) scheme.
- Clear Communication Strategies: Establish clear protocols for communicating with affected parties, regulatory bodies, and the public.
- **Continuously Improve Response Capabilities**: Learn from each incident to strengthen future responses and refine organisational readiness.

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### References

Having well-documented, actionable incident response plans for both ransomware and data breaches is essential for healthcare providers to minimise operational disruption, maintain regulatory compliance, and protect patient privacy. Both plans provided in this section emphasise rapid detection, effective containment, and post-incident review to continuously improve response capabilities. Regular training and drills, aligned with local regulatory requirements (such as Cyber.gov.au, OAIC guidelines, and the NDB scheme), will ensure that staff are ready to act swiftly and decisively in the event of a cyber incident.

| Ransomware  | <ol> <li>Ransomware Playbook   Cyber.gov.au</li> <li>Report and recover from ransomware   Cyber.gov.au</li> <li>Report   Cyber.gov.au</li> <li>ReportCyber_A3_Poster.pdf</li> <li>ReportCyber_Crime_Incident_Vulnerability_A3_Poster.pdf</li> </ol>       |
|-------------|---|
| Data Breach | <ol> <li>Data breach response plan   OAIC</li> <li>Data breach action plan for health service providers   OAIC</li> <li>Guide to mandatory data breach notification in the My Health Record system   OAIC</li> <li>Report a data breach   OAIC</li> </ol> |



## Ransomware Incident Response High-Level Playbook

The **Ransomware Incident Response High-Level Playbook** is tailored to help healthcare organisations in Australia swiftly and effectively respond to a ransomware attack. This playbook provides a structured approach that ensures your organisation can contain the threat, recover critical data, and comply with relevant Australian regulations, such as the **Privacy Act 1988** and the **Notifiable Data Breaches (NDB) scheme** under the **Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC)**. It offers practical guidance for minimising downtime, communicating with stakeholders, and meeting legal obligations while safeguarding sensitive health information.

| No. Stage |                               | Action   | Explanation   |  |
|-----------|-------------------------------|--|---|--|
| 1         | Preparation                   | - <b>Develop a Ransomware Incident Response Plan</b> : Define roles, responsibilities, and procedures for responding to ransomware incidents.      | Establish a clear and tested plan to ensure coordinated and effective response. Regularly update and refine the plan.     |  |
|           |                               | - <b>Backup Strategy</b> : Implement a robust backup strategy using the 3-2-1 rule (three copies of data, two on different devices, one offsite).  | Ensure backups are secure, isolated from the network, and regularly tested for integrity to prevent loss of data.         |  |
|           |                               | - <b>Employee Training</b> : Conduct regular security awareness training focused on phishing, social engineering, and ransomware-specific threats. | Human error is the primary attack vector for ransomware. Training employees to recognise malicious activity is critical.  |  |
| 2         | Detection &<br>Identification | - Monitor for Ransomware Indicators: Look for unusual system behaviour, file encryption, or ransom notes.  | Use monitoring tools like EDR (Endpoint Detection and Response) and SIEM to detect suspicious activity.                   |  |
|           |                               | - Identify the Ransomware Variant: Recognise the strain (e.g., Ryuk, WannaCry) to guide specific responses.  | Identifying the ransomware variant helps in determining if there are known decryption tools or specific mitigation steps. |  |



|   |                 | - Disconnect Infected Systems: Isolate compromised                | Disconnecting infected systems stops lateral      |
|---|-----------------|---|---|
| 2 |                 | systems from the network to prevent the spread of                 | movement and limits further damage to critical    |
|   | Contoinmont     | ransomware.   | systems.  |
| 3 | Containment     | - Disable Remote Access: Temporarily block RDP and VPN            | Ransomware often spreads through remote           |
|   |                 | access to prevent further exploitation.                           | desktop and VPN services; blocking these access   |
|   |                 |   | points can halt the spread.                       |
|   |                 | - Remove Ransomware from Systems: Use anti-malware                | Run scans using trusted anti-malware software to  |
|   |                 | tools to remove the ransomware from infected systems.             | ensure the malware is fully removed from all      |
| 1 | Fradication     |   | affected devices.                                 |
| 4 | Elauication     | - Apply Patches: Ensure that all security patches and updates     | Patch any vulnerabilities exploited during the    |
|   |                 | are applied to systems and applications.                          | attack to prevent re-infection and ensure systems |
|   |                 |   | are secure.                                       |
|   |                 | - Restore from Backups: Ensure that backups are free of           | Restore systems from backups that were made       |
|   |                 | ransomware before restoring systems. Use clean, validated         | before the ransomware attack to ensure no         |
| _ | Recovery        | backups.  | remnants of the malware remain.                   |
| 5 |                 | - System Restoration: Gradually rebuild affected systems and      | Ensure a phased restoration to minimise system    |
|   |                 | services, restoring them to operational status in priority order. | downtime and ensure the integrity of critical     |
|   |                 |   | services is maintained.                           |
|   |                 | - Report to Authorities: Notify the appropriate authorities,      | Reporting helps authorities track cybercrime      |
|   |                 | such as the Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), and          | patterns, provides guidance, and supports further |
| • | Communication & | report the ransomware incident via ReportCyber.                   | investigation.                                    |
| 6 | Reporting       | - Inform Stakeholders: Notify internal teams, executives, and     | Clear and timely communication is vital for       |
|   |                 | affected parties about the attack, recovery status, and           | managing the incident and keeping all             |
|   |                 | necessary actions.  | stakeholders informed.                            |
|   |                 |   |   |

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| 7 | Post-Incident<br>Review   | <ul> <li>Root Cause Analysis: Investigate how the ransomware<br/>entered the system and identify weaknesses in security<br/>controls or processes.</li> <li>Evaluate Response Effectiveness: Assess how well the<br/>team responded to the ransomware incident and identify areas<br/>for improvement.</li> </ul>                    | A thorough analysis helps prevent future attacks<br>and ensures that gaps in security practices are<br>addressed.<br>Review the incident response to identify areas for<br>improvement in both technology and processes for<br>better future responses.          |
|---|---------------------------|--|--|
| 8 | Continuous<br>Improvement | <ul> <li>Enhance Security Defences: Use insights from the attack to bolster defences such as endpoint protection, network segmentation, and email filtering.</li> <li>Update and Re-test Incident Response Plan: Adjust and improve the incident response plan based on findings from the ransomware attack and recovery.</li> </ul> | Strengthen defences based on lessons learned<br>from the incident to minimise future risk and<br>increase resilience.<br>Conduct regular tabletop exercises and simulation<br>tests to validate and update the plan, ensuring<br>readiness for future incidents. |



## Ransomware Incident Response Comprehensive Technical Playbook

Larger healthcare organisations in Australia with dedicated internal security teams may find it useful to refer to a more technically detailed and comprehensive ransomware playbook, such as the one available at the following link: <u>https://github.com/socfortress/Playbooks/tree/main/IRP-Ransom</u>.





## Data Breach Incident Response Playbook

The **Data Breach Incident Response Playbook** is designed for healthcare organisations in Australia to respond effectively to a data breach involving sensitive patient data. In line with Australian health regulations, including the **Privacy Act 1988** and the **Notifiable Data Breaches (NDB) scheme**, this playbook provides clear, step-by-step instructions to help you assess, contain, and report the breach in a timely manner. It also covers the communication process with affected individuals, regulatory bodies, and stakeholders, ensuring that your organisation complies with legal requirements and maintains patient trust throughout the incident response process.

| No. Step |                | Action  | Explanation   |  |
|----------|----------------|---|---|--|
| 1        | Preparation    | - Develop a Data Breach Response Plan: Define roles, responsibilities, and actions to take in the event of a data breach.                                   | Establish a formal, clear data breach response<br>plan. Review and update annually to stay<br>compliant with privacy laws.        |  |
|          |                | - Data Classification & Encryption: Ensure that all sensitive data is classified and encrypted at rest and in transit.                                      | Protect sensitive information (e.g., patient data)<br>from unauthorised access by using encryption<br>and proper access controls. |  |
|          |                | - Implement Regular Security Audits: Conduct frequent audits and vulnerability assessments to detect potential security gaps.                               | Proactive auditing helps ensure that security controls are effective and comply with regulatory requirements.                     |  |
| 2        | Detection &    | - Detect the Data Breach: Identify signs of unauthorised access<br>or data leakage (e.g., unusual access logs, unauthorised file<br>transfers).             | Use monitoring tools (e.g., SIEM, DLP solutions) to detect breaches early and prevent further unauthorised access.                |  |
|          | Identification | - Classify the Breach: Identify whether the breach involves personal or health-related information and classify the severity of the breach.                 | Classifying the breach helps determine the required response, notification requirements, and remediation steps.                   |  |
| 3        | Containment    | - Limit Access to Breached Data: Restrict further access to the compromised data and isolate systems if necessary to prevent further leaks.                 | Immediately containing the breach helps minimise further exposure and loss of sensitive data.                                     |  |
|          |                | - Secure the Vulnerable Systems: Patch any vulnerabilities that<br>may have been exploited in the breach (e.g., outdated software or<br>misconfigurations). | Apply security patches to fix vulnerabilities and prevent further exploitation of the system.                                     |  |



| 4 | Eradication                  | - Remove Unauthorised Access: Revoke access to compromised accounts and change credentials to prevent further data exfiltration.   | Eliminating unauthorised access stops the breach and ensures the intruder cannot continue accessing sensitive data.      |
|---|------------------------------|--|--|
|   |                              | - Deploy Remediation Measures: Apply additional security measures such as advanced monitoring tools, enhanced access controls, or intrusion prevention systems.                              | Strengthen security postures by deploying additional layers of defence after the breach is eradicated.                   |
| 5 | Recovery                     | - Restore Affected Systems: Rebuild or restore systems that were compromised, ensuring that they are free of any backdoors or malware before bringing them back online.                      | Ensure systems are fully restored and secured before being reintegrated into the environment.                            |
|   |                              | - Verify Data Integrity: Confirm that no unauthorised changes or data corruption occurred during the breach.   | Data integrity checks ensure that no sensitive information was tampered with or modified during the breach.              |
| 6 | Communication &<br>Reporting | - Report to Authorities: Notify the Office of the Australian<br>Information Commissioner (OAIC) and affected individuals within<br>required timeframes (e.g., 30 days).                      | Reporting to the OAIC is legally required under<br>Australia's Privacy Act 1988 for serious data<br>breaches.            |
|   |                              | <ul> <li>Notify Affected Individuals: Provide timely notifications to<br/>individuals whose data was compromised, including details on<br/>what happened and what they should do.</li> </ul> | Transparent communication with affected individuals is critical for trust and compliance with legal requirements.        |
| 7 | Post-Incident<br>Review      | - Conduct Root Cause Analysis: Investigate the breach's cause, and evaluate how security controls failed to prevent the breach.  | Analyzing the breach will uncover weak points in the organisation's security posture and operational processes.          |
|   |                              | - Review and Improve Policies: Review the incident response procedures, security protocols, and employee training to identify opportunities for improvement.                                 | Continuous improvement ensures that policies evolve to address emerging threats and maintain compliance.                 |
| 8 | Continuous<br>Improvement    | - Update Security Policies: Adjust data protection policies, security procedures, and incident response plans to reflect lessons learned from the breach.                                    | Updating security frameworks strengthens defences and helps prevent future breaches by closing gaps.                     |
|   |                              | - Conduct Simulated Breach Exercises: Regularly test your incident response and recovery plans through tabletop exercises and simulations.   | Simulated exercises help ensure that staff are prepared to act quickly and effectively in the event of an actual breach. |



## Data Breach Incident Response Comprehensive Technical Playbook

Larger healthcare organisations in Australia with dedicated internal security teams may find it useful to refer to a more technically detailed and comprehensive data breach playbook, such as the one available at the following link: <u>https://github.com/socfortress/Playbooks/tree/main/IRP-DataLoss</u>





## Get Your Healthcare Security Score: Free Self-Assessment & Expert Review

Your healthcare organisation's security is crucial to protecting sensitive data and ensuring compliance. Whether you're looking to assess your current posture or take immediate steps to improve your defences, we're here to guide you.

| Step   | Action   | Details  | What You'll Get   | Why Take This Step  |
|--------|--|--|---|---|
| Step 1 | <u>Complete the Free</u><br><u>Self-Assessment</u> | Start by evaluating your<br>healthcare security posture<br>with our easy-to-use tool.<br>It provides immediate<br>feedback and your security<br>score. | <ul> <li>Instant Feedback on your<br/>current security posture</li> <li>Pass/Fail Score to gauge your<br/>standing</li> <li>Actionable Insights for areas<br/>needing improvement</li> </ul>                                | <ul> <li>Identify Gaps in security and compliance</li> <li>Prioritise Areas needing immediate<br/>attention</li> <li>Gain Confidence in taking the right steps<br/>towards stronger security</li> </ul> |
| Step 2 | Book the 1-Day Expert<br>Review                    | Book a <b>1-Day Paid Expert</b><br><b>Review</b> for a <b>deeper</b><br><b>analysis</b> of your security<br>controls and tailored<br>recommendations.  | <ul> <li>In-Depth Security Evaluation<br/>of your systems, processes, and<br/>compliance</li> <li>Strategic Recommendations<br/>to address gaps</li> <li>Post-Review Consultation for<br/>follow-up and guidance</li> </ul> | <ul> <li>Maximise Security by identifying risks</li> <li>Save Time with expert guidance in one day</li> <li>Stay Compliant with healthcare<br/>regulations and standards</li> </ul>                     |

#### **Ready to Get Started?**

Don't leave your security to chance. Take the first step toward a safer, more secure healthcare environment today.

- <u>Complete the Free Self-Assessment</u>
- Book the 1-Day Expert Review



## Annex 1 – How Ransomware Incident Occur

Source: <u>https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance/ransomware-playbook-itsm00099</u>



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## Annex 2 – Security Controls to Reduce the Risk of Ransomware

Source: https://www.cyber.gc.ca/en/guidance/ransomware-playbook-itsm00099





## Annex 3 – The Value of Healthcare Data in Australia

Healthcare data is one of the most valuable types of personal information globally, and in Australia, it is no different. This data includes personal identifying information (PII), medical histories, prescription records, insurance details, and more, all of which are crucial to providing quality healthcare but also represent a significant target for exploitation. In Australia, healthcare data is subject to strict privacy laws and regulations, but its value in both legitimate and illicit markets makes it highly vulnerable to misuse. When compromised—whether through data breaches, cyberattacks, or insider theft—healthcare data can be sold and used in ways that benefit criminals, fraudsters, and sometimes even legitimate businesses for targeted marketing or profit-driven agendas.

The different ways healthcare data is exploited, especially when stolen, can be broken down into several areas:

## 1. Fraud and Identity Theft

Stolen healthcare data is an attractive commodity for cybercriminals in Australia because it combines sensitive health information with financial data, such as Medicare numbers and private health insurance details. Criminals use this information to engage in various types of fraud, including:

- Synthetic Identity Creation: Criminals can use stolen data, such as names and Medicare numbers, to create synthetic identities, which combine real and fabricated information to apply for loans, credit cards, or government benefits in the victim's name.
- Medical Fraud: Fraudsters may use stolen personal health details to submit false claims to private health insurers or the government for services or medications that were never provided. This can also include creating fake prescriptions, especially for high-demand or expensive medications.

In both cases, healthcare data is used to defraud insurance providers or government programs, ultimately driving up healthcare costs for the rest of the population.

## 2. Pharmaceutical Targeted Marketing and Exploitation

One of the more controversial and unethical uses of stolen healthcare data is its sale to pharmaceutical companies for targeted marketing. With detailed access to a patient's medical records—ranging from their diagnosis to prescribed medications—pharmaceutical companies can tailor marketing campaigns to individuals based on their health conditions, treatments, and behaviours.

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- Targeted Advertising Based on Health Conditions: In Australia, pharmaceutical companies often use healthcare data to send tailored advertisements for medications to individuals suffering from specific conditions, such as diabetes, asthma, or heart disease. While the goal is to raise awareness of treatments, this practice often favours profit-driven motives over the patient's best interests, particularly when the patient is unaware that their data is being used in this way.
- Predictive Analytics for Future Health Needs: Pharmaceutical companies also use healthcare data to forecast which patients may be at risk of developing certain conditions. For instance, if a patient's data shows early signs of developing cardiovascular disease, the company might target them with marketing for preventive treatments or lifestyle programs aimed at addressing risk factors. Although this practice is marketed as beneficial for patient health, it raises ethical questions about the manipulation of patient decisions for profit.
- Patient Compliance and Retention: Pharmaceutical companies can also use healthcare data to monitor prescription refill rates and adherence to treatments. If a patient stops using a medication or switches to a cheaper generic version, the company might send them promotional offers or reminders to continue using a branded product, increasing their profits while potentially pushing patients towards more expensive or unnecessary treatments.
- Selling Data to Data Brokers: In addition to direct sales, pharmaceutical companies often acquire patient data through third-party data brokers, who collect, anonymise, and sell patient information. This aggregated data may still be identifiable through advanced analytical techniques, enabling companies to launch hyper-targeted marketing campaigns, which, even if legally anonymised, still raise concerns about patient privacy.

## 3. Prescription Drug Fraud and Misuse

Stolen healthcare data can also be used to facilitate prescription fraud and the illicit distribution of controlled substances in Australia. With access to personal health records and Medicare details, cybercriminals can create fake prescriptions for opioids, stimulants, or other high-value drugs, which are then sold illegally on the black market. Similarly, fraudsters can use stolen health insurance details to obtain expensive medications, which they can sell or misuse.

The misuse of healthcare data for prescription drug fraud is not only a financial issue; it also contributes to Australia's opioid crisis and other substance misuse problems.

## 4. Social Engineering and Phishing Scams

Fraudsters in Australia can also use stolen healthcare data to carry out social engineering or phishing scams. By accessing patients' personal information, including details about their health conditions and insurance, criminals can create highly convincing scams that trick individuals into providing more sensitive information.

Securing Healthcare: Essential Cybersecurity Controls for Safeguarding Patient Information



For example, a scammer might pose as a healthcare provider or insurance representative, claiming they need to verify a patient's details to process a claim or offer new benefits. Since the scammer already has a lot of personal information, the victim may believe the call is legitimate and hand over sensitive data, such as bank account numbers or login credentials to their online healthcare portals.

## 5. Blackmail and Extortion

Another concerning use of stolen healthcare data is blackmail. Medical records often contain sensitive information that could cause embarrassment, harm, or reputational damage if it were made public. This includes information on mental health, sexual health, HIV status, and previous substance abuse. Cybercriminals can use this data to extort victims, threatening to release their private health details unless a ransom is paid. While this is often tied to ransomware attacks, in which the data is encrypted and held hostage, data extortion specifically involves threats of exposure without necessarily encrypting the data.

## 6. Impact on Healthcare Costs and Insurance Fraud

The illegal sale of healthcare data can contribute to insurance fraud in Australia. Fraudsters may use stolen Medicare or private health insurance information to make fraudulent claims, driving up the overall cost of healthcare services. This impacts premium rates, increases government healthcare spending, and ultimately results in higher costs for everyone.

Additionally, fraudulent claims can divert resources away from those who truly need care, leading to inefficiencies in the healthcare system and delays in receiving proper medical treatment.

## Conclusion: The Growing Problem of Healthcare Data Exploitation in Australia

The value of healthcare data in Australia is undeniable, but its potential for exploitation—whether through fraud, targeted marketing, or extortion poses significant risks to patients and the healthcare system as a whole. While healthcare data can be used responsibly to improve patient care and inform public health initiatives, its illegal sale and unethical use for commercial gain remain a major concern. As data breaches become more frequent and healthcare systems become increasingly digital, patients must remain vigilant about the security of their personal health information. Stronger data protection laws, greater transparency in the use of healthcare data, and more rigorous oversight of those who collect, store, and sell this data are essential to safeguarding privacy and maintaining trust in the Australian healthcare system. Without stronger protections, the risk of exploitation will continue to grow, raising profound questions about the ethical use of personal health information and the long-term impact on patient rights.

Securing Healthcare: Essential Cybersecurity Controls for Safeguarding Patient Information

## Cybersecurity That Shields Australia's Healthcare, Today and Tomorrow









